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Abstract
Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design
(e.g. fair division, item allocation). However, computing equilibria requires large
amounts of information (e.g. all valuations for all buyers for all items) and compute
power. We consider ameliorating these issues by applying a method used for
solving complex games: constructing a coarsened abstraction of a given market,
solving for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and lifting the prices and allocations
back to the original market. We show how to bound important quantities such as
regret, envy, Nash social welfare, Pareto optimality, and maximin share when the
abstracted prices and allocations are used in place of the real equilibrium. We then
study two abstraction methods of interest for practitioners: 1) filling in unknown
valuations using techniques from matrix completion, 2) reducing the problem
size by aggregating groups of buyers/items into smaller numbers of representative
buyers/items and solving for equilibrium in this coarsened market. We find that in
real data allocations/prices that are relatively close to equilibria can be computed
from even very coarse abstractions.
1 Introduction
The problem of solving for the equilibrium prices and allocation of a market economy has large
informational and computational requirements (Hayek, 1945). In this work we apply the idea of
abstraction to market equilibrium computation. We construct a simplified model of a market (aka.
an abstraction), solve for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and then lift the answers back to the
original market. We derive analytic bounds for the error in the computed equilibrium as a function of
abstraction quality, describe two methods of abstraction that can be useful in practical problems, and
evaluate our approach on real datasets.
Computing optimal allocations subject to constraints has been a problem of interest since the inception
of modern economic theory. Early applications included trying to use linear programming to plan
the entire Soviet economy (Kantorovich, 1960, 1975). Modern market designers, with slightly less
grand visions, also use centralized algorithms to construct allocations with various properties such
as incentive compatibility, envy free-ness, stability, efficiency, and notions of fairness (Roth, 2002;
Klemperer, 2018).
The computation of market equilibrium is used as a component of a powerful allocation algorithm:
competitive equilibrium from equal incomes, CEEI (Varian et al., 1974). Individuals are endowed
with a budget of pseudo currency, give their valuations for items, an equilibrium of the resulting
market is computed, and individuals receive the allocation from this equilibrium. This mechanism is
known to have good allocative properties including that it is approximately incentive compatible in
the large (Budish, 2011) and produces allocations which maximize the product of utilities (a.k.a Nash
social welfare), a criterion that “exhibits an elusive combination of fairness and efficiency properties”
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(Caragiannis et al., 2016). CEEI and related algorithms are deployed in practice in course allocation
at Wharton Business School (Budish et al., 2016) or in Spliddit, an online application which helps
groups of individuals allocate tasks such as household chores (Goldman and Procaccia, 2015).
We will focus on the canonical case of Fisher markets. In Fisher markets we have a set of divisible
items to be allocated and a set of individuals who may receive the items. Individuals have a total
budget of money and valuations for each item. Formally, a market equilibrium consists of a price
for each item and an allocation such that 1) individuals cannot improve their utility by using their
budgets to purchase a different set of items (given the prices) and 2) the total demand for each item
(ie. the sum of the solution of each individual’s maximization problem of allocating their budget) is
equal to the supply.
The equilibrium in Fisher markets that maximizes Nash social welfare can be computed by solving
the Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program (Eisenberg and Gale, 1959). In addition to being useful for
fair division (Caragiannis et al., 2016) the EG solution has strong connections to budget smoothing in
auction markets (Conitzer et al., 2018a). More generally Fisher markets and their equilibria can be
related to methods for budget smoothing both in first- and second-price auction markets (Conitzer
et al., 2018b,a).
Scaling market equilibrium computation to larger markets requires solving two major challenges.
First, one needs access to large amounts of information (e.g. every person’s valuation for every item
or item combination). Second, one needs access to enough compute power to solve the related convex
or mixed integer program which, even if it is theoretically solvable in weakly polynomial time (Nisan
et al., 2007), becomes unwieldy for large (e.g. thousands or millions of buyers) markets.
In this paper we consider solving for equilibria of large markets by introducing the notion of market
abstractions. We use the information we have to create an abstraction (a simplified model of the
market), solve for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and then project the answers to the original
market. We provide a general set of results that bound various quantities (regret, envy, Pareto
optimality, Nash social welfare) of buyers if we use the allocation/prices derived from the abstraction
rather than the true equilibrium.
We then turn to practice and focus on two abstraction methods of particular interest. The first is using
techniques from matrix completion to infer valuations for person/item pairs that we may not have
access to. We refer to this as low rank markets. The second is reducing the size of the market (and
thus computational burden) by replacing groups of buyers (or items) with a representative buyer or
representative item, solving for equilibrium in the representative case and then splitting the allocation
of each representative among the individuals/items it represents. We refer to this as representative
market equilibrium. We show that this abstraction reduces computational complexity and can be
efficiently parallelized. We show two ways of performing the lift to the original market, a proportional
and a recursive version, and discuss the tradeoffs of each one.
We apply these abstraction methods, which can be used together, to real datasets including a novel
one which we have collected and evaluate the quality of solutions with various levels of abstraction.
We find that the equilibria found even in very coarse abstractions have quite decent properties.
2 Related Work
The use of equilibrium assumptions to make estimates of deep ‘structural’ parameters is of interest in
both applied micro and macroeconomics (Berry et al., 1995; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2018). Often
the lack of individual-level data and/or compute power requires the use of representative agent
(i.e. a single consumer that represents all individuals in the economy). To get around this issue,
analysts typically make (strong) assumptions which imply that the equilibrium prices/aggregate
decisions/some structural parameters computed using a representative-agent stand-in are equivalent
to the ones that would be derived from a model which includes all individual agents. In our work we
are specifically interested in the situation where these assumptions are not true and the lifted answer
from the abstraction does not yield the true equilibrium prices/allocation. There is increasing interest
in using heterogenous agent models in applied economic modeling (Hommes, 2006) and expanding
our results to these cases is an interesting direction for future work.
Abstraction is an idea often used in the context of games. In two-player, zero-sum games (e.g. poker)
a popular goal is to compute a Nash equilibrium strategy during training time and use it in actual play
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against opponents. In large games, however, it is impractical to solve for the Nash of the original
game and practitioners solve for the Nash equilibrium of an abstraction and then lift it to be a strategy
for the original game. Abstractions often use heuristics and are hand tuned (Gilpin et al., 2007; Waugh
et al., 2009; Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2014; Brown et al., 2015; Brown and Sandholm, 2018) but
more recently have begun to be constructed automatically using function approximation (e.g. deep
learning) (Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2018). In games, unlike in markets, the relationship
between the quality of abstraction and the quality of the lifted strategy in the original game has been
heavily studied (Lanctot et al., 2012; Kroer and Sandholm, 2014, 2016, 2018).
There is some literature on abstraction in non-market-based allocation problems (Walsh et al., 2010;
Peng and Sandholm, 2016; Lu and Boutilier, 2015). The scalability problem faced in the allocation
setting is similar to ours, but because the underlying optimization problem is very different (i.e. the
maximization of allocative efficiency rather than a market equilibrium) the abstraction methods and
results in these papers are quite different in character from ours.
Finally there is a large literature on computing market equilibria in Fisher markets using convex
programming (Eisenberg and Gale, 1959; Shmyrev, 2009) or gradient-based methods (Birnbaum
et al., 2011; Nesterov and Shikhman, 2018). There is also work extending the EG program to new
settings such as quasi-linear utilities and indivisible items (Cole et al., 2017; Cole and Gkatzelis,
2018; Caragiannis et al., 2016). Our paper complements this existing work as our results are agnostic
to the algorithm used for equilibrium computation; any of these algorithms can be employed for
computing a market equilibrium in conjunction with our market abstraction model.
3 Market Equilibrium in Fisher Markets
In this paper we focus on the canonical Fisher market setting with linear utilities. We have a set of n
buyers and a set of m goods (items). We assume that items are divisible and denote by X a matrix of
allocations of items to buyers where xij refers to the share of item j allocated to buyer i. Each item j
has a supply of sj . We say an allocation is a full allocation if the sum of each column j of X is sj .
Each buyer i is endowed with a budget Bi. We denote by V ∈ Rn,m+ the matrix of values with vij
being the value of buyer i for item j and vi the vector of values for buyer i. For a given allocation X
we assume that total values are additive and linear i.e.
ui(xi) = vi · xi =
∑
j
vijxij
.
Definition 1. Given prices p ∈ Rm+ for the goods, a demand for buyer i is
di(p) = {arg max
x:x·p≤Bi
vi · xi}.
The demand can be set valued but the maximum reachable utility given a price vector is unique.
Definition 2. A set of prices and an allocation (p,X) is a market equilibrium if xi ∈ di(p) and X is
a full allocation.
An equilibrium is computable using the Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program (Eisenberg and Gale,
1959) whose solution has an elegant structure: for every good that an individual is receiving in their
equilibrium allocation they receive equal ‘bang per buck’. Formally, in equilibrium (p∗, X∗)
if x∗ij , x
∗
ij′ > 0 then
vij
p∗j
=
vij′
p∗j′
In EG equilibrium prices and per-buyer utilities are unique (there may be multiple equilibrium
allocations, for example, if buyers view 2 goods as perfectly interchangeable). We refer to this market
equilibrium as the EG equilibrium.
The structure of the EG equilibrium makes CEEI in Fisher markets attractive for centralized division
algorithms since this equilibrium maximizes the geometric mean of individual utilities weighted by
budgets - i.e. the Nash social welfare when budgets are 1 (Varian et al., 1974; Caragiannis et al.,
2016). For this reason the solution is also referred to as the max Nash welfare (MNW) allocation.
3
4 Abstractions of Markets
We are interested in settings where we do not have full access to the valuation matrix V . Rather, we
have an abstraction of V and a method L to deterministically lift any prices and allocations back up
to the original market. We refer to these lifted quantities as (pˆ, Xˆ). In addition our lift is such that if
(pˆ, Xˆ) correspond to an equilibrium in the abstraction, then the lift returns a Vˆ of the same size as the
original market such that (pˆ, Xˆ) form an equilibrium in Vˆ .
This motivates our main question
Question 1 (Main Question). If (pˆ, Xˆ) is an equilibrium with respect to Vˆ what can be said about it
relative to the true valuation matrix V ?
Definition 3. We define the abstraction error as ∆V = V − Vˆ . We use ∆vi to denote vi − vˆi.
We can prove the following simple Lemma:
Lemma 1. If X,X ′ are feasible allocations such that vˆi · xi +  ≥ vˆi · x′i then vi · xi +  ≥
vi · x′i + ∆vi · (xi − x′i) ≥ vi · x′i − ‖∆vi‖1.
This Lemma will give us our main theoretical results:
Result 1 (Main Results (Informal)). Properties which are ‘linear’ in prices and allocations can be
related linearly to various matrix norms of ∆V . These properties include regret, Nash social welfare,
envy, Pareto optimality, and maximin share.
Quantifying the error in the abstraction based on norms of ∆V has a particular advantage: it allows
us to apply well-known effective data-driven matrix methods such as low rank approximation and
k-means clustering. The next section discusses our theoretical results in detail.
5 Approximation Results
We now look at how well properties of market equilibria are maintained in the equilibria derived from
abstractions. We relate these quantities to various matrix norms of the error matrix ∆V . Individual
bounds will largely be in terms of ‖∆vi‖1, the `1-norm of the change in values for buyer i. Bounds
over all agents will mostly use the `1, `∞-norm for matrices, but where the `1 is applied to rows
rather than columns:
‖∆V ‖1,∞ = max
i∈[n]
‖∆vi‖1.
Note that the standard definition of this norm is to apply it to columns, not rows. Our definition can
be thought of as the standard definition, but with a transpose applied before invoking the norm.
While this paper primarily focuses on the divisible setting, our results in this section all carry over to
the indivisible setting.
5.1 Individual optimality notions: envy, regret, and maximin share
First we look at individual notions of optimality. These measures will compare how satisfied
individuals are under their allocation Xˆ .
We begin with asking how well an equilibrium (pˆ, Xˆ) represents buyers’ true preferences. Although
in many assignment problems prices are only ‘virtual’ we can still judge the lifted equilibrium by
using the abstracted price vector. One notion of how happy individuals are with their allocation Xˆ
is the regret of the allocation. That is, how close is xˆi to actually being a demand vector given the
prices pˆ? Here we measure regret with respect to the supply constraints when the buyer can buy all
items for themselves. Formally the regret of a buyer under a solution (pˆ, Xˆ) is
Regreti(pˆ, Xˆ) = max{ui(xi) : xi ∈ Rm+ , xi · pˆ ≤ Bi, xi ≤ s} − ui(xˆi).
By definition, in equilibrium, regret is 0.
The envy for buyer i is the amount by which they prefer any other buyers’ allocation over their own.
Equilibrium allocations are envy free in the equal-incomes setting where all buyers have the same
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budget. Envy is often used as a fairness metric in the fair-division setting (Varian et al., 1974; Budish,
2011; Caragiannis et al., 2016). Formally, the envy is
Envyi(Xˆ) = max
i′∈[n]
ui(·xˆi′)− ui(xˆi).
Note that the envy gap is zero in this definition, if buyer i prefers their own bundle.
Finally, we look at a weak notion of fairness: the maximin share (MMS) guarantee. MMS is the
value that buyer i would obtain if they were allowed to choose any allocation X into n bundles, but
were then assigned their least-valued bundle mini′ ui(xi′). MMS was introduced by Budish (2011),
and it generalizes the fair-share notion of divisible assignment to the indivisible setting. In fair-share
assignment, each buyer i is required to receive an allocation that they like at least as much as the one
where they receive a fraction 1n of each item. Since MMS generalizes fair share our result below
applies to both fairness notions.
Formally, the MMS guarantee of buyer i is
MMSi = max
x∈X
min
i′∈[n]
ui(xi′).
We say that the MMS gap for buyer i in allocation x is
MMS gapi(Xˆ) = max(0,MMSi − ui(xˆi)).
The main result of this section shows that regret, envy, and MMS errors are bounded by the norm of
the approximation error.
Theorem 1 (Regret, Envy, MMS are linear in abstraction quality). The regret, envy, and MMS gap
of buyer i for any allocation Xˆ under Vˆ is maintained under V up to individual additive error of
‖∆vi‖1 for regret and envy, and 2‖∆vi‖1 for the MMS gap. The maximum additive error over buyers
is thus bounded by ‖∆V ‖1,∞.
5.2 Global optimality notions: Pareto Optimality and Nash Social Welfare
Often in market design the goal is to maximize social welfare, i.e. the sum of buyer utilities. However,
in general, a market equilibrium may not lead to a social-welfare-maximizing solution. This is easy
to see by considering the solution to the problem of maximizing geometric-mean utility: it is a market
equilibrium, but it will never set any buyer utility to zero, even when that is the only way to maximize
social welfare.
Instead, the usual efficiency criterion for market equilibria is that they are Pareto optimal (see e.g.
Varian et al. (1974); Budish (2011); Caragiannis et al. (2016)). Nonetheless, Pareto optimality can
be related to weighted social welfare: Negishi’s theorem (Negishi, 1960) says that given a market
equilibrium, there exists a set of utility weights {βi} specifying the utility rate of each buyer such that
the market-equilibrium allocation is the allocation that maximizes weighted social welfare. We can
use this to show that a solution to Vˆ approximately solves the weighted-social-welfare-maximization
problem for a particular set of weights:
Theorem 2 (Weighted social welfare is linear in abstraction quality). Let Xˆ be the allocation of a
market equilibrium for Vˆ , and {βi} the associated Negishi social-welfare weights. Then Xˆ solves
the problem of maximizing social welfare for V under weights {βi} up to an additive error of at most
‖β‖1‖∆V ‖1,∞.
Now we show that any Pareto-improving allocation has some buyer that does not gain much.
Theorem 3 (Ability to Pareto improve is linear in abstraction quality). Any Pareto-optimal solution
under Vˆ is such that any Pareto-dominating allocation under V has a buyer i whose utility improves
by at most ‖∆vi‖1.
Theorems 2 and 3 show that a solution X computed for Vˆ is approximately Pareto optimal for V in
two senses: It approximately solves the weighted-welfare maximization problem under the Negishi
weights from Vˆ , and there is a small amount of strong Pareto improvement. However, there is a third
sense of Pareto improvement which we cannot bound: there may be a Pareto improvement where
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some buyer does not gain a lot, but the total improvement to (unweighted) social welfare may be
large. We call this largest improvement to unweighted social welfare under any Pareto improvement
the Pareto gap. Theorem 2 guarantees that if the Pareto gap is large, then the large improvements
will be for buyers with low Negishi welfare weights, and thus they are, in a sense, buyers whose
unweighted utility should not be highly prioritized in market equilibrium.
So far we have discussed global optimality from the perspective of Pareto optimality. However,
another global optimality condition that has gained recent interest from the perspective of fairness
is Nash social welfare, which is deployed on Spliddit (Caragiannis et al., 2016). The Nash social
welfare (NSW) is the product of buyer utilities, formally
NSW(X) =
∏
i∈[n]
ui(xi).
We now show that NSW is also maintained up to multiplicative error in the approximation.
Theorem 4 (Nash Social Welfare is multiplicatively related to abstraction quality). The NSW of
the optimal solution Xˆ under Vˆ , is bounded by the NSW of the optimal solution X∗ to the original
problem as follows:
NSW(X∗) ≤
∏
i∈[n]
(
1 +
‖∆vi‖1
uˆi(x∗)
)
NSW(xˆ).
This assumes uˆi(x∗i ) > 0 for all i, i.e. the difference between V and Vˆ should be such that the
original optimal solution still has nonzero value under Vˆ .
Note that the theorem also implies a bound for the geometric mean of the buyer utilities, which is the
n’th root of the NSW.
6 Abstractions in Practice
The two major obstacles to computing equilibria in practice are information requirements (needing to
know every element of V ) and computation requirements. We now describe two techniques—matrix
completion and the use of representative buyers/items—that can be used to reduce these burdens. We
discuss how they fit into the framework of abstractions, and relate them to our abstraction bounds
derived above. Figure 1 summarizes the two abstraction approaches.
Figure 1: Two abstraction methods that can be used together to reduce information and computational
constraints. Left: Low rank matrix completion uses observed data to discover a latent vector for
each item and buyer. Unobserved valuations are approximated using the dot product of these vectors.
Right: Representative buyer/item abstractions collapse multiple buyers and/or multiple items into
single representative agents.
Recall that most of the bounds (with exception of the Nash social welfare) related the quality of the
equilibrium (pˆ, Xˆ) to ‖∆V ‖1,∞. We can also replace this norm with the Frobenius norm by using
the inequality
‖∆V ‖1,∞ = max
i∈[n]
‖∆vi‖1 ≤ max
i∈[n]
√
m‖∆vi‖2 ≤
√
m‖∆V ‖F .
Thus we can replace these bounds by a (less tight) bound of
√
m||∆||F . This suggests that when we
are looking for ways to abstract our market, we should try to find ways that minimize ||V − Vˆ ||F .
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6.1 Low Rank Matrix Completion
We begin with the information problem, that is, the case where not all entries of V are known to
us. Without some imputation of the missing entries, we cannot compute an equilibrium. If every
vij is completely independent and unpredictable from other valuations of the same buyer or other
valuations of the same item by other buyers, then we have no hope of filling in missing entries in a
sensible way. However, in most real world situations this is likely not the case and there is shared
information across entries of the valuation matrix. To fill in the missing entries we can use standard
techniques from matrix completion (e.g. (Recht, 2011)).
A standard method for matrix completion is given some observations O of elements from a matrix V
with generic element vij we try to find a set of vectors vec(i) ∈ Rd for every buyer i and vec(j) ∈ Rd
for every item j to solve
min
vec
∑
vij∈O
(vij − vec(i) · vec(j))2.
After we fit this model, we can construct a now complete matrix Vˆ of the original dimensionality
with vˆij = vec(i) · vec(j) and use this in place of V for our task of interest. The solution ends up
effectively minimizing minVˆ ||V − Vˆ ||F over rank d matrices Vˆ .
6.2 Representative Market Equilibrium
The computation problem of equilibrium comes from the fact that every step of a first order method
must solve a maximization problem for each buyer and compare the sum of those demands to the
supplies of each item. If an abstraction can reduce the number of buyers (and/or items), it can
make the computation of equilibrium much more efficient. Given a valuation matrix V we consider
abstracting the market as follows:
Algorithm 1 Representative Market Equilibrium
Input: O of known valuations with generic element oij
procedure CONSTRUCT REPRESENTATIVES
Get vectors for each buyer vec(i) and item vec(j)
If V is fully available, use the row/columns as the vectors
Use k-means clustering on the buyer vectors with nˆ centroids
Use k-means clustering on the item vectors with mˆ centroids
Use centroids of k-means as vector representations of representatives
Set representative market valuations as dot products of above vectors
procedure COMPUTE REPRESENTATIVE SUPPLIES/BUDGETS
Sum budgets of buyers assigned to representative i by k-means to get budget
Sum supplies of items assigned to representative j by k-means to get supply
Compute market equilibrium in the representative market
6.2.1 Proportional Lift
The algorithm above constructs a representative market equilibrium (RME) which we denote as
(p∗rep, X
∗
rep). The RME is of a different dimension than the original market. The question is now how
to lift the prices and allocations to the original items and buyers. Prices are simple, we can just assign
to every item j the price of its representative item from the RME.
Allocations are more difficult. We first consider a proportional lift. We perform the lift in two steps.
First we begin with X∗rep and construct a new allocation X
′ of dimension nˆ×m with x′i being the
allocation of original items to each representative buyer. Each representative buyer receives a supply
weighted share of each item. Let r(j) be the representative item for real item j. Then the amount of
item j that is allocated to representative buyer i in this step is
x′ij =
sj∑
k∈r(j) sk
x∗ir(j).
Given X ′ we finish the lift by now splitting items across individuals proportional to their budget. We
denote the final allocation as Xˆ with dimension n×m. Let r(i) denote the representative buyer for
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real buyer i. The allocation of item j to real buyer i is
xˆij =
bi∑
k∈r(i) bk
x′r(i)j .
Because everything is allocated proportionally we have that the supply constraint binds and thus the
allocation is a full allocation. The proportional lift has the advantage that it is simple to compute and
that our bounds can be applied directly. The allocation from the proportional RME are equivalent to
those which would result if we constructed a Vˆ by getting vector representations for each buyer/item,
getting their representative abstraction and replacing vij by vec(r(i)) · vec(r(j)).
6.2.2 Recursive Lift
The section above divides items assigned to a representative buyer to each of its original buyers
proportional to their share of the representative-buyer budget. However, in practice we may wish to
perform this lift from representative buyer to original buyer in a smarter way.
We propose doing this by first allocating original items to each representative buyer just as above. We
then solve a new market-equilibrium problem independently for each of the nˆ representative buyers
using the assignments from the proportional allocation as item supplies. The resulting equilibrium
allocation for each representative buyer is then used instead of the proportional allocation. Note that
we cannot use the prices from these assignments as they are conditional on a subset of the supply, so
we use the original representative-item prices. We call this approach recursive representative market
equilibrium (RRME).
Note that this method does not give us a straightforward Vˆ to apply our bounds. However, we can
relate various RRME quantities to those that would obtain under the proportional lift (which does
have an associated Vˆ ). We now show that RRME is guaranteed to improve on the proportional split
on several metrics: Pareto gap, regret, MMS gap, and NSW.
Theorem 5 (Recursion is Better than Proportional). Let (pˆ, Xˆ) be a solution obtained from propor-
tional allocation from a representative market instance. Let (pˆ, Xˆr) be the solution obtained by
applying the recursive-reallocation to the representative market solution. The RRME solution leads
to weakly lower Pareto gap, regret, and MMS gap, as well as weakly higher NSW.
We relegate the proof to the Appendix but the intuition for the results comes from the utility guarantee
provided by market equilibrium, which says that each buyer does better than their budget-proportional
allocation of each item.
Of course, there are tradeoffs to using the recursive lift. The recursive lift requires us to compute
nˆ more market equilibria. Importantly, though, each of them is considerably smaller than the full
problem and since they have no cross dependencies this procedure can be efficiently parallelized. In
addition, while the objectives in Theorem 5 are all guaranteed to improve, envy may get worse. On
balance, however, the recursive lift is likely better in practice than the proportional one.
Example 1. Consider a 5-buyer-4-item instance with valuations v1 = v2 = [1.5, 1.5, 0, 0], v3 =
[0, 0, 1 + , 1 − ], v4 = [0, 0, 1 − , 1 + ], v5 = [1.5, 1.5, 1 + , 1 − ] and budgets of 1. Now
consider the abstraction where buyers 1, 2, 5 are clustered to a representative buyer with valuation
v1˜ = [1.5, 1.5, 0, 0] and budget 3, and buyers 3, 4 are clustered to a representative buyer with
valuation v2˜ = [0, 0, 1.5, 1.5] and budget 2. The representative market equilibrium with equal rates
is to assign representative buyer 1˜ all of items 1 and 2, each with price 1.5 and assign representative
buyer 2˜ all of 3 and 4 at price 1 each. This assignment leads to no envy when we perform the
budget-proportional allocation. However, if we apply RRME then representative buyer 1˜ still gets
proportionally allocated, but for representative buyer 2˜ buyers 3 and 4 get assigned all of items 3
and 4, respectively. Now buyer 5 envies buyer 3, as they could get  more utility.
7 Experimental Evaluation
7.1 First-Order Methods for Market Equilibrium
We initially attempted to solve the EG convex program directly via the CVXPY package (Diamond
and Boyd, 2016; Akshay Agrawal and Boyd, 2018). However, this turned out to have numerical
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problems once the number of agents and items reach around 130 each. We tried several solvers
including ECOS (Domahidi et al., 2013), CVXOPT (Andersen et al., 2013), and SCS (O’Donoghue
et al., 2016).
To solve our scalability issues we propose solving the EG convex program via first-order methods for
solving the following Lagrangian relaxation:
min
0≤p≤‖B‖1/s
∑
i∈[n]
max
0≤xi≤s
Bi log(vi · xi)− p · xi + s · p (1)
A similar formulation was suggested by Nesterov and Shikhman (2018), where they focus on a more
general case (with unbounded prices) and arrive at an algorithm that converges at a rate of 1√
T
, where
T is the number of iterations.
We can leverage the structure of our problem to provide even better worst-case bounds on convergence.
Because in practice such worst case bounds are rarely reached and because these theoretical results
are not the primary focus of our paper we discuss them informally here for completeness and relegate
the formal statements to the appendix:
Result 2. Under mild assumptions we can construct an algorithm that converges to the EG equilib-
rium at a rate of 1T iterations.
Because of the structure of our problem we can also give bounds for the computational savings
incurred by our representative buyer/representative item abstractions:
Result 3. Let n, m be the number of buyers/items in the original market and nˆ, mˆ be the number
in the abstracted market. Under mild assumptions the representative buyer/item abstraction with
proportional lift has a worst case convergence rate that is O( nˆ
7
2 mˆ2
n
7
2m2
) of the convergence rate of the
full problem. If we use the recursive lift instead the relevant speedup is O( nˆ
5
2 mˆ2
n
5
2m2
).
While we do not take the rates completely seriously, the results do suggest that we should expect
larger savings in computational complexity for ‘long and thin’ markets (those with many buyers and
relatively few items) than those with many items and few buyers.
7.2 General Analysis Plan
We now evaluate the abstraction approaches above on several real datasets. We first discuss the
analyses we perform on all datasets then we discuss each dataset in detail and give results.
For each dataset we compute the EG equilibrium in the full market and compare to the
prices/allocations we generate using abstractions. We set budgets to 1 and supplies to be such
that there is 1 item per person (note that since we are in the divisible case, this only affects the
prices/allocations up to a scaling factor).
We vary three properties of abstractions jointly. First, we replace the valuation matrix V with a rank
k approximation for various k. To compute these low rank representations we use the singular value
decomposition (SVD). Second, we consider compressing the large number of buyers into a smaller
set of representative agents. We refer to this as abstraction coarseness and measure it in percentage
of original market size. Thus, a 40% abstraction is one which replaces the 7200 original buyers
with 2800 representative buyers via the k-means procedure above. Third, we compare the use of a
proportional split and the recursive splitting.
We measure all of our theoretical quantities of interest: regret of each individual given each allocation
(we normalize this by the maximum utility of the allocation), an individual’s envy (again, normalized
by the utility that an individual would receive from the envied bundle), Nash social welfare (normal-
ized by the Nash social welfare of the unabstracted market), Pareto optimality (normalized by the
utility in the Pareto optimal allocation), maximin share (normalized by utility being achieved).
We also look at one quantity for which we do not have bounds: total welfare/efficiency of the
allocation (normalized by the total welfare of the unabstracted market). Note that market equilibrium
makes no pretense of maximizing efficiency (indeed it only guarantees Pareto optimality and, in the
case of EG equilibrium, Nash social welfare).
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7.3 Dataset: Jester1
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Figure 2: Market created by using valuation matrix from the Jester1 dataset with 7200 buyers and 100
items (left panel). There is clear structure suggesting compressibility. Here we apply representative
buyer abstraction only. Equilibria computed in quite coarse abstractions maintain good properties
(right panel).
We begin by considering an existing dataset used for the evaluation of recommender systems. In
typical recommender system datasets individuals give a rating (rather than a monetary evaluation)
for each object). Nevertheless, standard recommender system datasets are still useful examples of
valuation matrices for two reasons: first, when equilibrium computation is used for market design/fair
division (e.g. CEEI and related algorithms at Wharton or Spliddit) the budget given to each individual
is only virtual currency and, second, allocations in EG equilibrium are not affected by the scaling
of an individual’s utilities so they are relatively robust to different ways individuals may interpret
ratings.
The first dataset we consider, Jester 1, contains the evaluation of 100 jokes by over 79,000 individu-
als (Goldberg et al., 2001). We extract a submatrix of 7200 individuals that have rated all of the jokes
giving us a complete market. Ratings in Jester are on a continuous scale between -10 and 10 and our
theory requires positive valuations so we shift the valuations to be strictly positive by shifting the
whole matrix by +10.
Figure 2 left panel shows a representation of the Jester1 valuation matrix with lighter colors represent-
ing higher valuation. To show the structure more clearly we normalize each individual’s valuations
to lie in [0, 1] for the figure1 (not the experiments) and perform clustering on the rows and columns
to set the order they will be displayed. There is very clear block structure suggesting that we can
abstract the market using the representative agent method effectively.
The right panel shows our main results. Even a very coarse abstraction with recursion (720 repre-
sentative buyers for 7200 original buyers and 20 % rank compression) can yield an allocation that
achieves almost 90% of the Nash social welfare and efficiency of the unabstracted allocation and is
almost Pareto optimal (there exists an allocation that improves total utility by 10 % without leaving
anyone worse off). Individuals display some regret (the abstracted allocation achieves 85% of the
utility they could achieve if buyers optimized given the abstraction prices) and some envy. Finally,
we see that a weak notion of fair division, maximin share, is almost completely guaranteed under
even the coarsest abstraction.
7.4 Dataset: Household Items
We also construct a new dataset of individuals evaluating 50 household items. Unlike in typical
recommender datasets where items can often be naturally be clustered into ‘types’ (e.g. romance
1Recall that since EG equilibrium with budgets is equivalent to equal utility rates per item being received
multiplying an individual’s utility by a constant does not affect the equilibrium allocation).
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Figure 3: Market created by using valuation matrix from the Household Item dataset with 2876 buyers
and 50 items (left panel). There is clear structure suggesting compressibility. In this experiment
we apply representative buyer abstraction only. Equilibria computed in quite coarse abstractions
maintain good properties (right panel).
movies, horror movies) we specifically chose items to span a broad range of product categories
(examples: rain jacket, tool box, toaster, shovel, bluetooth headphones, thermos, blackout shade, bike
pump, etc... see Appendix for full list of items and average valuations for each one). Items were
chosen to be representative of a large number of categories to make our compression problem more
difficult.
In an online survey individuals from the US were presented with a photo and brief description of
each item. To deal with quality issues specific brands and models for each item were selected from
an online review site to be the ‘best in their class’ and participants were informed of this. Items were
presented in a random order and participants entered a personal US dollar valuation for each item. At
the end of the survey participants were asked how well they felt they understood the questions/task.
We use data from the 2876 individuals (out of 3300) that said they felt the task was natural and they
could give a good personal valuation for all of the items.
Again, we apply matrix approximation, representative buyer/item modeling, and recursive reallocation.
Using the raw data we found that several individuals entered valuations of 0 for 20 or more items
and low valuations for others. This means that many allocations gave them a utility of 0 and thus
gave a Nash social welfare (product of utilities) of 0. In the results reported here we replace these 0
valuations with 1; we find it does not change any other metric by a meaningful amount but now does
allow us to construct meaningful estimates of Nash social welfare.
Figure 3 shows the market, represented as in the Jester1 experiment above (left panel) as well as
our main results (right panel). We see that even coarse abstractions can yield good properties and
that recursive allocation meaningfully improves Pareto optimality and Nash social welfare of the
approximations. There is a sharper tradeoff between compression/low rank approximation and
abstraction performance than in Jester. Recall though that this is because our candidate items were
specifically chosen to be of quite different types and so display lower inter/intra item correlations in
valuation than typical recommender datasets of e.g. jokes or movies.
7.5 Dataset: MovieLens
Both datasets above includes many more buyers than items. We would like to consider a dataset
where both sides of the market are large. However, asking individuals to evaluate many hundreds
of items would be expensive and likely yield low quality data. Instead, we construct such a market
from MovieLens 1M (Harper and Konstan, 2016), a standard dataset for the evaluation of matrix
completion algorithms. This dataset contains 6040 individuals with their ratings for a selection of
3952 total movies. In total, the dataset includes 1 million ratings. We treat each 1-5 rating as a
valuation.
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MovieLens 1M is very sparse (only a small percentage of possible user/movie rating pairs are
observed) so we cannot compute the ground truth market equilibrium as we could in the other
datasets. To get around this we use this data to construct a complete market. We compute a low
rank approximation to the true rating matrix using standard methods (see Appendix for full details)
and consider the submatrix which consists of the 1500 movies with the most observed ratings (avg.
number of ratings: 579) and the top 1500 users who have rated the most movies (avg. number of
ratings: 425). We use this submatrix as our valuation matrix for the market (Figure 4 left panel shows
the market).
Because the completion method already uses a low rank approximation and because we cannot get
the ground truth market equilibrium we only test the representative agent abstraction here. Unlike in
the datasets above we construct both representative buyers and representative items. Figure 4, right
panel, shows that in this case even an extremely coarse abstraction (150 representative buyers, 150
representative items instead of the original 1500) can achieve outcomes that are quite close those of
the full equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Market created by using valuation matrix from the MovieLens dataset with 1500 buyers
and 1500 items (left panel). There is clear structure suggesting compressibility. In this experiment
we apply both representative buyer and representative agent abstraction. Equilibria computed in quite
coarse abstractions maintain good properties (right panel).
8 Conclusion and Future Directions
Computing market equilibria is a difficult problem. We have shown that the method of abstraction -
solving a coarser problem and lifting the solution - can be used to reduce the information requirements
and computation requirements of equilibrium computation. In addition, we have introduced a new
dataset that we hope others can use for work on fair division.
There are many future directions to expand this research. In this work we looked at Fisher markets
which assume additive valuations. This rules out situations where goods can be complements or
substitutes. In the case of such preferences the information required to compute a market equilib-
rium becomes extremely large as we need to know the valuations of individuals for every possible
combination of goods (Porter et al., 2003). However, recent work has begun to explore represent-
ing preferences with complements and substitutes in low rank vector format (Ruiz et al., 2017;
Peysakhovich and Ugander, 2017). An interesting future direction is combining such techniques
with abstraction methods. Generalizing beyond linear valuations could lead to greater scalability for
problems such as public decision making, which have recently been related to market equilibria (Garg
et al., 2018).
We considered the use of market equilibria as allocation mechanisms (as in e.g. the literature on
fair division). However, another important use of computation of market equilibria is counterfactual
estimation as in structural models in economics (Berry et al., 1995; Chawla et al., 2017). For example,
an online marketplace may want to know how prices (and thus revenues) would change if certain
12
market conditions (e.g. supplies, budgets) were to change. Using the method of abstracting large
markets to answer such questions is also an important future direction.
We looked at two methods that could be used in concert for abstraction creation: low rank approx-
imation and representative buyer/item modeling. The representative market abstraction speeds up
computation but we did not use low rank structure for anything but filling in missing data. An
interesting algorithmic question is whether the low rank structure can be leveraged to speed up the
gradient calculation steps of our first order methods, for example, by employing recent techniques for
fast nearest neighbor search (Johnson et al., 2017).
Our work fits into the nascent but growing literature on combining techniques from machine learn-
ing/AI with classical results from game theory to solve market design (Feng et al., 2018; Golowich
et al., 2018), game abstraction (Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2018), and agent design (Lerer
and Peysakhovich, 2017, 2019) problems that cannot be easily solved in closed form. In this work we
leveraged very standard linear abstractions (low rank approximation, k-means clustering). A question
for future work is whether more complex, non-linear methods, can be used to construct even better
abstractions.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Lemma 1. The first inequality follows from linearity of valuations along with the definition
of ∆Vi:
vi · xi +  = vˆi · xi + ∆vi · xi +  ≥ vˆi · x′i + ∆vi · xi = vi · x′i + ∆vi · (xi − x′i).
The second inequality follows by observing that x′i − xi ∈ [−1, 1]m and thus ∆vi · (x′i − xi) ≤‖∆vi‖1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Individual Optimality Results. First we show the regret bound. Let rˆi be the
regret bound for each buyer i under Vˆ . By the definition of bounded regret we have that for all i
Lemma 1 is satisfied for any budget-and-supply-feasible xˆ′i with  = rˆi, thus bounding regret under
V by rˆi + ‖∆vi‖1.
Next we show the envy bound. By the definition of the envy gap we have that for all j 6= i Lemma 1
is satisfied for the pair xˆi, xˆj with  = Envy gapi. The result follows immediately by taking the
maximum over buyers.
Finally we show the MMS bound. Let X be an allocation obtaining the MMSi guarantee. It follows
that for all i′ ∈ [n]
MMSi ≤ vi · xi′ = (vˆi + ∆vi) · xi′ ≤ vˆi · xi′ + ‖∆vi‖1.
Thus when making bundles under Vˆ buyer i can choose X and achieve at least MMSi − ‖∆vi‖1,
which shows that the MMS guarantee for buyer i under Vˆ is at least MMSi − ‖∆vi‖1. Now let Xˆ be
an allocation with MMS gap i under Vˆ ; this can similarly be bounded in order to show the result:
MMSi − ‖∆vi‖1 ≤ vˆi · xˆi + i = (vi −∆vi) · xˆi′ + i ≤ vi · xˆi′ + ‖∆vi‖1 + i.
Proof of Theorem 2: bounded improvement to Negishi-weighted social welfare. By Negishi’s wel-
fare theorem Xˆ is such that
∑
i∈[n] βivˆi · xˆi ≥
∑
i∈[n] βivˆi · xˆ′i for all feasible allocations Xˆ ′.
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Thus we get ∑
i∈[n]
βivi · xˆi =
∑
i∈[n]
βi(vˆi + ∆vi) · xˆi
≥
∑
i∈[n]
βivˆi · xˆ′i +
∑
i∈[n]
βi∆vi · xˆi
=
∑
i∈[n]
βivi · xˆ′i +
∑
i∈[n]
βi∆vi · (xˆi − xˆ′i)
≥
∑
i∈[n]
βivi · xˆ′i −
∑
i∈[n]
βi‖∆vi‖1
≥
∑
i∈[n]
βivi · xˆ′i − ‖βi‖1‖∆V ‖1,∞
Proof of Theorem 3: small strong Pareto improvement. Let Xˆ be any Pareto-optimal solution under
Vˆ , and assume that Xˆ is not Pareto optimal under V . Let X be the Pareto-improving allocation.
Since Xˆ was Pareto optimal under Vˆ we know that there exists some buyer i such that the condition
of Lemma 1 holds with  = 0 for that buyer. This immediately implies the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4: Bounded NSW. We have
NSW(X∗) =
∏
i∈[n]
vi · x∗i =
∏
i∈[n]
(vˆi · x∗i + ∆vi · x∗i ) =
∏
i∈[n]
vˆi · x∗i
(
1 +
∆vi · x∗i
vˆi · x∗i
)
Now we can use the fact that X∗ is feasible under Vˆ to note that its value must be less than that of Xˆ:
≤
∏
i∈[n]
vˆi · xˆi
(
1 +
∆vi · x∗i
vˆi · x∗i
)
≤
∏
i∈[n]
vˆi · xˆi
(
1 +
‖∆vi‖1
vˆi · x∗i
)
= NSW(Xˆ)
∏
i∈[n]
(
1 +
‖∆vi‖1
vˆi · x∗i
)
.
Proof of Theorem 5: RME weakly improves buyer utilities. First we note the following simple fact
which holds for any buyer i: the utility of i under Xr is weakly greater than that under X , i.e.
vi · xri ≥ vi · xi. This is because (a subset of) Xr is a market equilibrium in the recursive market for
the corresponding i˜, and a buyer is guaranteed to get at least the value of the budget-proportional
allocation in any market equilibrium.
The Pareto gap is the value of a linear program that maximizes social welfare (minus current welfare)
subject to the constraint that each buyer is weakly better off. Since utilities are greater in Xr this is a
strictly more constrained problem than for X , and thus the value, i.e. the Pareto gap, is lower.
Since we keep prices the same the optimal bundle x∗i for each buyer remains the same for (X, p) and
(Xr, p). Thus the only affected part of regret is the negative term, which is weakly greater under Xr
since utilities are weakly greater.
That the MMS gap is smaller and NSW greater follows directly from each buyer having weakly-higher
utility.
9.2 Convergence Rates of RME Computation
Formulation (1) allows us to apply standard algorithms for solving convex-concave saddle-point
problems such as the primal-dual algorithm of Chambolle and Pock (2016, 2011) (henceforth referred
to as PD). PD is an algorithm for solving problems of the following form (we omit some generality
which we do not need):
min
x∈X
max
p∈P
L(x, p) := xTKp+ f(x) + s · p (2)
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where K is a matrix with bounded norm L = ‖K‖ = max‖x‖≤1,‖p‖≤1 xTKp, and f is a proper,
lower semicontinuous convex function with a Lipschitz-bounded gradient, i.e. ‖∇f(x)−∇f(x′)‖2 ≤
Lf‖x− x′‖2 for all x, x′ ∈ X .
An iteration of PD is as follows:
(xˆ, pˆ) =PDτ,σ(x¯, p¯, x˜, p˜) where{
xˆ = arg minx∈X f(x¯) + 〈∇f(x¯), x− x¯〉+ xTKp˜+ 1τ ‖x− x¯‖
pˆ = arg minp∈P 1σ‖x− x¯‖ − x˜TKp
The algorithm repeatedly calls PD to generate a sequence of iterates as follows (note that the function
invocation depends on the computed value, this is implementable because xt+1 is computed before
pt+1):
(xt+1, pt+1) = PDτ,σ(xt, pt, 2xt+1 − xt, pt)
The average iterates x¯ =
∑T
t=1 x
t and p¯ =
∑T
t=1 p
t converge to a saddle-point solution at a rate of
O(
(L+Lf )Dx+LDp
T ), where Dx, Dp is the maximum value of the `2 norm over X and P respectively.
Note that we upper bound the price vector p by the sum of budgets ‖B‖1, and each allocation vector
xi by the supply of each item. This does not change the set of equilibria, as these conditions are all
guaranteed to be satisfied in equilibrium.
We now show how to instantiate our SPP (1) in terms of the generic SPP (2). We have that X is
the product of allocation vectors ×i∈[n]{xi : 0 ≤ xi ≤ s} over the buyers, and P = {p : 0 ≤ p ≤
‖B‖1/s} is the set of price vectors. K is an nm×m matrix representing
∑
i∈[n] p · xi, i.e. with a 1
in each row/column-pair r, j when the row r corresponds to a variable that denotes assigning item
j to some bidder. The norm L of K is
√
n, which is achieved by any pair x, p such that pj = 1 for
some j, and xij = 1√n , with all other entries 0, or by setting p =
1√
m
, x = 1√
mn
.
The logarithm in the objective function presents a challenge because the gradient is unbounded near
zero; this problem can be addressed by noting that agents are always guaranteed to receive their MMS
value in equilibrium, and thus we can add the additional constraint vi · xi ≥ MMSi to the feasible set
of each agent, thereby bounding the gradient difference Lf by maxi∈[n],j∈[m]
vijBi
MMSi
. In practice we
found that utilities did not approach zero and thus this projection was unnecessary.
The value of Dx is n‖s‖22, the maximum is achieved by setting xij = sj for all i, j. The value of Dp
is
∑
j∈[m](‖B‖1/sj)2, the maximum is achieved by setting each price at its upper bound.
Putting together this construction gives an algorithm that converges to a saddle point of (1) at a rate of
max
p∈P
L(x¯, p)−min
x∈X
L(x, p¯) ≤ O
(
(
√
n+ maxi,j
vijBi
MMSi
)n‖s‖22 +
√
n
∑
j∈[m](‖B‖1/sj)2
T
)
.
Now we see that if we solve a clustering ({Ci˜}, {Cj˜}) we get the following convergence rate:
O
(
(
√
nˆ+ maxi∈[nˆ],j∈[mˆ]
vˆijBˆi
MMSi
)nˆ‖sˆ‖22 +
√
nˆ
∑
j∈[mˆ](‖Bˆ‖1/sˆj)2
T
)
. (3)
Furthermore, each iteration is of order O(nˆmˆ) rather than O(nm). To get a sense of the savings in
running time, say that supply and budgets are both 1. In that case the original problem has runtime
cost O(n7/2m2) (since the third term usually dominates), and thus compressing to 10% problem size
leads to a runtime decrease of factor 100− 3162 depending on whether the decrease in instance size
is primarily due to fewer items or buyers.
If we apply recursive lift then we have to solve k market equilibrium problems corresponding to
each cluster of buyers. The cost of computing the recursive allocations is the sum of the costs of
computing each recursive market equilibrium. This can be expressed as a sum over terms similar to
(3), but where nˆ, mˆ represent the size of the given recursive instance. Again we assume that budgets
and supplies are 1 to get a sense of runtime savings. We can then use the fact that the union of the
buyer clusters is [n] to bound the runtime as O(nnˆ5/2mˆ2), where nˆ, mˆ corresponds to the size of
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the recursive market equilibrium which maximizes nˆ5/2mˆ2. Thus even with the additional cost of
computing the RME allocation the runtime cost savings are on the order of 100− 316 for the case
where each recursive market is 110 the size of the original market.
9.3 Details of MovieLens Market Generation
To generate the complete submatrix for the MovieLens 1M market we take the observed ratings
denoted as O with generic element oij . We use PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017) and minimize the loss
function ∑
oij∈O
(oij − vec(useri) · vec(moviej) + bias(useri) + bias(moviej))2
over d dimensional vectors for each user and movie and 1 dimensional biases for each user and
movie. We random split the data into an 80% training set and a 20% validation set and cross-validate
the choice of d from the set {20, 30, 50, 70, 100} and the weight decay parameter from the set
{1e− 5, 1e− 4, 1e− 3, 1e− 2, 1e− 1}. We choose the best performing model via the validation set
(d=20, weight decay=1e− 5) which yields an RMSE of .88 which is comparable with other matrix
factorization approaches. Though we point out that more complex approaches, e.g. autoencoder-based
ones do outperform these models (Sedhain et al., 2015).
9.4 Details of Household Dataset
To construct the dataset we recruited US-based workers from an online labor market. We chose 50
items from a well regarded online review site and presented each one with each item asking them
to give their ‘person valuation’ for the item. Here we list the items we used as well as their average
valuations by individuals.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
christmas.tree.stand
multi.use.screwdriver
bike.pump
cat.bed
dog.coat
shovel
travel.mug
snow.shovel
growler
food.thermometer
smartphone.tripod
hairdryer
thermos
bath.towel
knife.sharpener
casserole.pan
lumbar.pillow
white.noise.machine
clothing.iron
sunrise.alarm.clock
bluetooth.keyfinder
wireless.receiver
toaster
toolbox
carbonator
blender
electric.toothbrush
electric.kettle
blackout.shade
portable.speaker
usb.battery
fireextinguisher
backpack
portable.ice.maker
space.heater
sheet.set
smart.bathroom.scale
coffee.maker
handheld.vacuum
tool.set
humidifier
vacuum.sealer
drone.for.beginners
Amazon.echo
air.mattress
portable.gas.grill
bluetooth.headphones
pressure.cooker
rainjacket
external.harddrive
0 20 40 60 80
Mean Valuation
Ite
m
Figure 5: Items used in household item survey as well as their average valuations and the standard
deviations of the reported valuations.
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